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Introduction
Over the last 150 years, there has been an endless stream of critical
literature on the theory of comparative advantage. Why should one
bother with yet another pa1er on the subject? It is the purpose of
this paper to show that the recent upsurge of critiques of the
standard theory of comparative advantage (as expressed in the
classical Ricardian forms and in the highly refined neo-classical form)
have far reaching consequences, not only theoretically, but in the
implications of the theories for policy and action in the concrete
world. Since the full implications of these critiques are only just
beginning to be worked out, only passing reference is made to some
of the consequences.
In this article, I deal only with what might be termed the neo-
Ricardian critique' of the theory of comparative advantage. A survey
of recent Marxist critiques of the theory of comparative advantage,
together with Marxist critiques of the neo-Ricardian trade theory,
will be the subject of a further paper.
Reasons for dissatisfaction with the prescription of specialization in
accordance with 'comparative advantage' in an ideal world of free-
trade and capital movements are not hard .to find. Apart from
revolutionary activity in the Third World, directed towards breaking
away from the world capitalist system, an obvious source of
discomfort to conventional wisdom is the rapid rise of inter and intra
national income inequality in the post-war era. This has occurred in
spite of a massive increase in trade and capital flows, which,
*David Evans is a Fellow of the institute of Development Studies.
The most important names associated with this critique are Emmanuel, Saigal,
Amin, Braun, Metcalfe, Steedman and Mainwaring. See bibliography for a list of
their most important writings.
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according to the neo-classical theory of comparative advantage,
should have resulted in a more equal distribution of the fruits of the
development of the forces of production. Over the last twenty five
years, free-trade (or freer-trade) policy prescriptions have been
accepted by many capitalist governments; the Kennedy Round tariff
cut is perhaps the most shining example of the successful imple-
mentation of this type of policy. Such policies are usually implicitly
or explicitly based on the neo-classical trade model, and have been
implemented both with and without a supplementary package of
policies designed to eliminate others which are counter productive,
to offset imperfections in the economy, and so on, as required to
validate the free or freer-trade policy. Whilst the neo-classical trade
model generates the presumption of potential economic benefits
from free-trade, and the more equal distribution of such benefits, the
fact that such predictions were not fulfilled need not necessarily be
taken as evidence that the model was wrong. It is possible that in a
second-best situation when special complicating real-world factors
are included in the model (factors which in no way undermine the
basic model), the observed outcomes are quite reconcilable with the
model. Alternatively the neo-classical model itself could be funda.
mentally flawed.
It will be argued here that the problems with both the neo-classical
and Ricardian models are more fundamental than has been generally
admitted. It is not simply a matter of taking into account more
realistic and complicating factors. It will be shown, for example, that
under the most simple assumptions about the nature of the world
economy, the general presumption in favour of free-trade will be
entirely removed from the theory of comparative advantage. This is a
matter of enormous importance, for at this level of abstraction even
Marx did not challenge Ricardo. Thus the neo-Ricardian critique is of
crucial importance for all who work on the problem of international
trade and value; an understanding of the neo.Ricardian critique of
the theory of comparative advantage is a prerequisite for the
development of a more satisfactory theory of international values.
For empirically oriented policy research, the consequences are far
reaching. An example close to the work, of IDS is the recommen-
dation of freer-trade in agricultural products to raise employment in
Third World countries, and possibly to improve income distribution
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as well, made in Singer et. al. (1973) and discussed by Singer and
Selwyn elsewhere in this bulletin. As will be shown later, whilst it is
possible to presume that such a policy will have favourable conse-
quences for employment and income distribution on the basis of the
type of evidence used by the authors, there remains the possibility
that there exists a radically different trading policy which would be
much better. This possibility is reinforced by the observation that,
under plausible dynamic assumptions, the short-run gains from freer-
trade may be eroded over time.
In the sections which follow, I will first outline the original Ricardian
theory of comparative advantage and the neo.classical development
from this theory. Passing reference will be made to modifications to
the neo-classical theory developed to try to encompass some
observed phenomenon i the real world without rejecting the
fundamental theory. The next two sections deal with the two routes
in the neo.Ricardian critique. The first is the capital-theory route
taken by Metcalfe, Steedman and Mainwaring, followed by the
'Unequal Exchange' route, stemming from the French Marxist,
Emmaiiuel. The neo.Ricardian trade model is then used to generalise
the Lewis surplus labour model, and to incorporate some of the
mechanisms influencing the distribution of the gains from trade
discussed by Prebisch and Singer. The final section deals briefly with
the 'Unequal Exchange' model as one starting point for the develop-
ment of a Marxist theory of international value. An appendix sets
out diagramatically Emmanuel's 'Unequal Exchange' model as a
special case of the Metcalfe-Steedman-Mainwaring model, and uses
this diagram to illustrate the points made on Lewis, Prebisch and
Singer.
Ricardian Theory and the Neo-Classical Development
Ever since the publication of Ricardo's Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation, the law of comparative advantage has never
been seriously challenged as the fundamental determinant of inter-
national trade and values, whether formulated in the Ricardian or in
the neo-classical framework associated with the names of Heckscher,
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Ohlin and Samuclson.2 The challenges of a long list of protectionist
theory and its associated free-trade doctrine have been integrated
into the main body of international trade theory.3 By directing
attention to correcting the malfunctioning of the market mechanisms
which operate in one way or another to give incorrect 'signals' as to
the direction of comparative advantage, the free-trade argument has
in general survived the onslaught (see for example Bhagwati, 1969).
Protectionist arguments arising out of the work of Keynes (1936),
from which it can be shown that a single country can gain from
protection in the presence of unemployment, do not constitute a
challenge to the theory of comparative advantage. Such problems, it
is argued, can be better dealt with by using fiscal policies to
overcome the market malfunction which gives risc to unemployment.
Considerations arising from the problem of decreasing costs and
external economies have been dealt with by the identification of
appropriate market interventions where the malfunctioning of
competitive markets leads to specialization against 'true' comparative
advantage. More recently, there has been work stressing the dynamic
nature of comparative advantage within the context of computable
programming models designed to give planners the 'right' price
signals for investment decisions (see for example Chenery, 1961, and
Bruno, 1970). Questions of domestic monopoly, factor price distor-
tions, incorrectly valued exchange rates, have been treated as a
market imperfection which can lessen the gains from trade arising
from specialization according to comparative advantage. In the
production of new technology, monopoly is in fact often regarded as
an essential market mechanism for attracting resources into R & D
(research and development) and for the realization of a comparative
advantage in R & D Monopoly in foreign trade also leads to one of
the few 'legitimate' arguments for export taxes or tariffs.
2There are, of course, some exceptions to this. For example, 'availability' has
been suggested as the fundamental determinant of what is traded. The direction
of trade flows has been related to similarities in income levels and demand
patterns, which is opposite to the theories of trade determination discussed here.
See Kravis (1956) and Linder (1961).
3See, for example, List (1885), Manoilesco (1931), Lewis (1954), Prebisch
(1950, 1959), Singer (1949a, b).
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Ricardo's concern with international trade is related to but not
integrated with his theory of capital accumulation in a closed
economy. Behind his analysis of accumulation was a deep concern
with the struggle for power in England between what he saw as a
progressive and modernizing industrial capital class and a reactionary
landed gentry living mainly on the rents from their agricultural land
(see Halévy, 1928). A related concern was the possible development
of revolutionary forces in the emerging industrial working class -
forces generated in part by the high cost of bread resulting from the
Corn Laws (in France in 1830 bread absorbed between 30 and 50 per
cent of a working man's wage - see Emmanuel, 1972). Ricardo's
demonstration of the possibility of gains from free-trade (especially
from the abolition of the Corn Laws) had the attractive feature of
providing a favourable outcome for industrial capital with whose
interests he closely identified. The removal of the Corn Laws would
lower the cost of bread, thus removing an immediate cause for
discontent amongst the working class. It would smash the landed
gentry as a serious challenge to the power of industrial capital,
releasing labour for employment in manufacturing. In short free-
trade would provide a basis for the expansion of industrial capital
without the shackles of the law of diminishing returns from land and
the long-run redistribution of income to the landed classes.
Ricardo's demonstration of the gains from free-trade, as indeed
almost every presentation of his argument since then, abstracts from
the dynamics of his theory of distribution discussed above. He
assumed that resources were mobile nationally but completely
immobile internationally and that labour was the only factor of
production considered explicitly, being employed in two branches of
production exhibiting constant return to scale. Significantly Ricardo
claimed that free-trade would lead to a gain for everybody in the
society; in fact one can demonstrate that there will be some gains
and losses with only a net potential gain for everybody. Given the
supply of labour in each country once machines and natural
resources are explicitly rather than implicitly included, the exchange
prices are proportional to relative labour inputs in internal trade.
Once the possibility of internal trade is introduced, then profitable
trade can take place between the limits set by the internal price
ratios, which are fundamentally determined by the technical condi-
tions governing labour inputs in each economy. These technical
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conditions are, in turn, influenced by the availability of machines
and natural resources which are only implicitly included in the
formal model considered by Ricardo, the famous England-Portugal
example. There is nothing in Ricardo's analysis to determine inter-
national values which are unhinged from the labour theory of value
and are left indeterminate.
Before dealing with the classical mechanisms for the determination
of international prices, several points should be noted. First, the
opening of trade implies the possibility of complete specialization in
the production in each country. Whilst it is easy to think of many
reasons why complete specialization will not take place, the assump-
tion of costless labour mobility to an alternative branch of industry,
even when complete specialization does not take place, hides behind
it a wealth of evidence of the direct costs of trade to those thrown
out of work by foreign competition - handicraft workers, small scale
producers, and so on - and indirect losses via the less dynamic
external economies in such industries. The converse of this is that
those engaged in the production of the exported good gain from the
increased demand for their product. It is around this issue that much
debate is generated, for the cost to those thrown out of work by
trade may be, at best, unskilled wage work and, at worst, permanent
underemployment. This consideration leads directly to the second
point, that the argument so far shows only potential gain for all from
trade and not, as Ricardo claimed, actual gain for all. For the latter
to be achieved, it is necessary not for those workers who gain
actually to compensate those who lose, but for the capitalists and
landowners in the declining industry also to be bought off. Thirdly,
the assumption made so far is that the gains from trade will all be
paid out in terms of higher wages to workers. However, there is no
reason why some of this should not go to profits and into accumula-
tion, as in the more dynamic analysis of distribution.
The classical solution to the determination of international values
was found in Mills' law of reciprocal demand. The introduction of
demand as the determinant of the equilibrium terms of trade in the
Ricardian model emphasizes the break from the labour theory of
value as the determinant of international values. However, there are
important considerations which modify this proposition, having
profound implications for the analysis of the distribution of the gains
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from trade between countries within the framework of analysis as
developed so far. If one retains a two-country split of the world, then
there is a presumption that all of the gains from trade will go to the
small country and that international values are 'determined' by the
relative labour costs of the large country.
The happy proposition that the big, rich countries of the world do
not gain as much from international trade as the poor, small and the
weak has been challenged within the context of the Ricardian
theory. Once many commodities and many countries are introduced
there would no longer be a presumption that the international values
will be determined by the cost conditions of the largest country (see
Graham, 1948). Rather, prices would be determined by the ratio of
labour costs on one of the many pairs of commodities produced in
any one of many countries. Thus, it will no longer be so likely that
all of the gains from trade will go to the smallest country, though the
practical importance of this has been played down.
A final note on modern day extensions of the classical trade model.
Modern linear programming can be used to solve the Ricardian trade
model (see Whitin, 1953, and McKenzie, 1954). This has led to the
development of a very large number of planning models in which
international trade has been incorporated, and a smaller number of
models designed to simulate the workings of a capitalist economy.
The spirit of all those models, which have been designed and
developed for the analysis of policy alternatives facing either central
planners in socialist countries or policy makers in capitalist
economies, remains essentially Ricardian.4
The differences between the Ricardian and Neo-classical (Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson) theories of comparative advantage, at the level of
comparative static analysis, lie mainly in the substitution of the role
of factor proportions as the primary determinant of comparative
advantage as distinct from differences in techniques of production.
In its most essential form, the neo-classical theory begins by
4Chenery (1961) discussed the philosophy behind many of these models as
applied to the so-called developing economies. Evans (1972) uses this type of
model for the analysis of trade problems in a small rich capitalist country. For a
survey of these models, see Taylor (1973).
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demonstrating the possibility of gainful trade when the techniques of
production are identical in all countries but the endowment of
productive factors differ. Naturally, if techniques of production
between two countries were in fact different, as in the Ricardian
case, then there will be additional reason for differing pre-trade price
ratios and the possibility of gain from trade. In addition, differences
in demand patterns will also give rise to differences in pre-trade price
ratios even if techniques and factor endowments are the same.
Whilst there is an elaboration of the types of factors which can lead
to the possibility of profitable international trade, the conclusions
reached with the aid of the static neo-classical model are very similar
to those reached with a static Ricardian model. The extension of the
international division of labour leads to the potential gain of all
members of society, with the given technical conditions of pro-
duction and preferences of consumers. Further, it can readily be
shown that if the neo-classical assumptions hold together with
certain empirically plausible restrictions on the production con-
ditions, the income of the owners of the factor used intensively in
the exporting industry will increase both absolutely and relatively
with the opening of trade, with the converse holding for the owners
of the factor used relatively intensively in the import competing
sector. The Ricardian propositions concerning the distribution of the
gains from trade between a large rich and small poor country will
tend to hold. This arises because it is more likely that the small poor
country will end up with a very high degree of specialization in
production, since its factor endowments will be very different from
those in the rich large country, leading to larger potential gain.
Finally, there are two elaborations of the neo-classical model of
special importance for later discussion.
Firstly, factor immobility plays a crucial role in the Ricardian
system, but this is not true for the neo-classical system. In fact,
within the comparative static neo-classical world it has been shown
that factor movements can substitute for commodity movements in
achieving the potential gains from international interaction (see
Mundell, 1957). This proposition is of enormous importance when it
is realised that there are serious barriers to trade and labour
movements, and natural resources are not easily transportable. What
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better argument for the free-flow of international capital? The
importance of this proposition for those who identify with the
interests of American and other rich country capital is quite similar
to Ricardo's demonstration of the gains from free-trade for manu-
facturing capital in 19th century Britain (see for example, Johnson,
1967). In the 'ideal' neo-classical case, the international capital flow
leaves the workers with the same income as with free-trade, the
domestic capitalists with the same returns, and the rest of the income
is paid out to the foreign capitalists. Thus, the domestic factors in
the country have the same relative (and absolute) income either with
free trade or with no trade and an inflow of foreign capital. The same
point applies to the international movements of labour, and lies
behind much of the discussion of the 'brain drain' by neo-classical
economists.
Secondly, there are some important neo-classical propositions which
arise from the consideration of economic growth and technical
change. Perhaps the most important proposition for consideration
here is the concept of immiserizing growth of factors of production,
or growth which leaves a country with both a relative and an
absolute lowering of income after growth (see for example Bhagwati,
1958, 1968, 1973). This phenomenon can occur for a wide variety of
reasons.
Consider first the effects of either technical progress or balanced
factor accumulation. At constant international terms of trade,
relative factor prices are unchanged by growth and consumption will
increase by the same percentage as production. Now if the rate of
balanced growth is higher than in the rest of the world (for the sake
of argument, the rest of the world does not grow), then some of the
benefit of growth must be lost via a deterioration in the terms of
trade. If the rest of the world is not growing, then the only way in
which the international markets will be cleared is for the price of
exports of the growing country to fall and the price of imports to
rise. The extent to which the terms of trade deteriorate will depend
(amongst other things) on the elasticity of demand for the growing
countries' exports and the ease with which production is shifted
from the export to the import competing industry. The more
inelastic the demand for exports and the possibilities of substitution
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into import competing production, the greater will be the decline in
the terms of trade. Further, if the growth is biased towards the
export sector (for example from more rapid growth of the factor
used intensively in the export sector), then the greater will be the
decline in the terms of trade. In essence this is the neo-classical
analysis of the problem of the tendency over some periods of the
terms of trade to move against poor primary produce exporting
countries, whose export industries tend to be labour intensive, and to
experience relatively rapid technical change. Further, these countries
often have a very rapid population growth, and demand for their
products in export markets tends to be inelastic.
It is a short step from the above analysis to establish the conditions
under which growth will lead to such a deterioration of the terms of
trade that the country is worse off than before growth. For example,
accumulation of the factor used intensively in export production
(say labour, the problem arising from a population explosion) will
lead to an absolute decline in importable production at constant
factor and commodity prices since some of the factor used inten-
sively in the importable sector must move into exportable pro-
duction. Of course, the converse of this is that a lack of growth in
such export industries will lead to a rapid improvement in the terms
of trade, as has occurred over recent years in a number of countries
exporting primary commodities.
A summary of the conditions for immiserizing growth (where growth
is defined in terms of the physical expansion of inputs rather than
income derived from production) is as follows:
the rest of the world's offer curve must be inelastic;
growth must be biased towards export production.
In addition, the following factors make immiserizing growth
more likely:
the ratio of total domestic production to imports is small;
the price elasticity of demand for imports is low;
the elasticity of supply of importables to a change in the price of
importables is small.
The list of circumstances under which immiserizing grqwth can occur
has been considerably lengthened. Distortions in factor markets,
tariffs and tariff-induced capital flows can all lead to immiserizing
37
growth (see Bhagwati, 1968, 1973). However, lest one despair that
this destroys the basic argument of the neo-classicists, that free-trade
is best, it is important to note that in all cases, immiserizing growth
can be overcome by some 'optimal' policy intervention. Further, the
only case which requires 'deviation' from free trade is that discussed
in detail above, where the consequences of immiserizing growth can
be removed by an optimal tariff in conjunction with such measures
as population control (if that is exacerbating the problem).5
A great deal of work has been done in recent years on fully dynamic
extensions of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. There is little
point in discussing these contributions, since the essential flavour of
the neo-classical approach has been established well enough for our
purposes and, as will now be shown, one of the crucial building
blocks of the neo-classical approach is valid only on the most
stringent assumptions about the nature of capital.
The Capital Theory Route to a Neo-Ricardian Critique
In all of the discussion of the neo-classical model so far, it has been
implicitly assumed that in principle, a unique measure can be found
for capital endowments. Unfortunately for the neo-classical trade
model, it is not possible to define capital as a part of 'factor
endowment', unless it is assumed that capital goods are homogeneous
(which obviously they are not - see Garegnani, 1970). With
heterogeneous capital goods, it is necessary to use some set of
weights to construct an index to measure the sum of all types of
capital endowments. An obvious set of weights is to use the labour
required directly and indirectly to produce capital goods, but then
one would no longer be dealing with capital as an independent
'factor' of production as is done under the neo-classical paradigm. An
alternative which would enable one to aggregate different types of
capital goods would be to use prices of capital goods. However, to be
useful to the neo-classical trade model (which predicts the direction
of trade on the basis of some measure of factor endowments), the
index of capital must be invariant with respect to changes in factor
prices. Otherwise, comparative advantage will be dependent on the
For an excellent summary of the neo-classical position see Sodersten (1970, ch.
12).
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distribution of income as well as factor endowments, the technical
determinants of production techniques and preferences in con-
sumption. An invariant measure of capital using price weights can be
made only in the case in which the capital/labour ratios are the same
in every industry, a restriction that attacks the very core of a theory
which sets out to predict the patterns of trade in the simplist case
where each industry throughout the world produces with identical
techniques of production (but techniques of production differ
between industries) and the only difference between countries is
factor endowments (see Metcalfe and Steedman, 1973a). lt is ironical
that the neo-classical theory should fall apart on the very point
for which Marx was so heavily criticised - the assumption of a
constant organic composition of capital (constant capital/labour
ratio) made in some parts of Capital.
A corollary of the demonstration that there is no measure of capital
which is invariant with respect to factor prices (or the distribution of
income) is the demystifying of the income distribution theory
behind the neo-classical model. That is, it is no longer possible to
identify a relationship between the marginal productivity of capital
or labour and to call it either the rate of profit or wages. Capitalists
as recipients of a reward for their contribution to production and
abstinence from consumption are decisively relegated to the realm of
ideology without an independent 'scientific' validity. As a result of
the capital theory point, the distribution of income becomes a
central determinant of the possibility of gainful international trade
and specialization. Thus the quest for squaring the observed reality
of a worsening distribution of income in the post war era with the
neo-classical model by the elaboration and extension of the model to
cover more complicated 'real world' factors is fundamentally mis-
taken, for the capital theory point attacks at the very core of a
factor-proportions theory of international trade, which includes
capital as an 'independent' factor.
The theoretical literature on the neo-Ricardian theory of inter-
national trade developing out of the Cambridge (England) side of the
capital theory debate has grown rapidly over the last two or three
years (also referred to as the 'English' neo-Ricardians for convenience
in later comparisons with 'Unequal Exchange' or 'French' neo-
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Ricardians). Theories of income distribution considered by the
'English' nco-Ricardians include a 'classical' theory of the determina-
tion of wages by subsistence or historically/socially/institutionally
given norms, or a neo-Keynesian theory based on capitalist savings
behaviour and the rate of growth6. Whilst some of the conclusions of
the neo-classical theory carry over to the neo-Ricardian theory when
capital is relegated to the role of a produced input, some of the most
important propositions do not. For example, the neo-classical theory
predicts that trade will raise the income of the factor intensively used
in export production. Whilst there are qualifications to the neo-
classical theory which will make this result less likely, there remains a
presumption that this will be the case. The neo-Ricardian theory
entirely removes this presumption: the more realistic world of
heterogeneous capital goods is more complex than the neo-classical
homogeneous capital world. More specificálly, in the work of Singer
et. al. (1973), and Singer's article in this bulletin, it is suggested that
lowering protective barriers in agricultural products in rich countries
will improve employment and possibly even income distribution in
poor countries via the expansion of relatively labour intensive
agricultural production. Whilst such a prediction is not inconsistent
with the 'English' neo-Ricardian model, such a trade strategy may
move the poorer countries away from a superior trading pattern. This
possibility arises since the converse can be shown: that opening trade
between capitalist countries will lead to a loss of both worker and
capitalist consumption. This result can be explained as follows:
In the neo-classical analysis, losses of economic welfare arise when
there are imperfections in the competitive market mechanism, such
as in the markets for capital and labour. Under these circumstances,
it is quite possible for free-trade to lead to specialization away from
'true' comparative advantage, leaving economic welfare lower after
trade than with no trade. This special case in the neo-classical model
is the general case in the neo-Ricardian model because of the
differences in the specification of capital. In the neo-classical model,
capital is a recipient of its 'marginal product' with no pure surplus or
profit paid to capital over and above its 'reward'. On the other hand,
6 See, for example, Metcalfe and Steedman, (1973a,b,c, 1974) and Mainwaring
(1973).
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in the neo-Ricardian model, capital receives only a pure surplus or
profit, there being no relationship between 'marginal product' and
the rate of profit. As a consequence of the different specification of
capital, there exists in the neo-Ricardian model a rate of profit which
plays a similar role in the market mechanism to the factor market
distortions in the neo-classical case, opening the possibility of loss
from trade. Thus, whereas for 'pure' capitalism in the neo-classical
case, free-trade must lead to a gain in economic welfare, capitalism in
the paradigm case is fundamentally flawed in the neo-Ricardian
model and is unable to guarantee gains from trade without the
intervention of the state to correct the 'wrong' price signals. Only
under an economically 'rational' socialism can the presumption of
gainful international trade be restored.
The 'Unequal Exchange' Route to a Neo-Ricardian Critique of the
Theory of Comparative Advantage
Under the general title of the theory of 'Unequal Exchange' (a term
introduced by the French economist Emmanuel), a critique has been
mounted of the accepted theory of international values which
attempts to place economic, social, political and historical forces and
their interaction as central determinants of the terms of trade and
the distribution of gains or losses from trade.1 In time, the 'Unequal
Exchange' theory appeared several years in advance of the neo-
Ricardian trade theory discussed in the previous section, and as far as
the present author is aware, the work by the 'English' neo-Ricardians
has been quite independent of the Unequal Exchange literature. The
theory of Unequal Exchange has been presented by Emmanuel as a
Marxist theory, using Marxist reproduction schemes in the theor-
etical exposition and Marxist terminology in the discussion. How-
ever, as argued particularly cogently by Betteiheim (1972) and Pilling
(1973), Emmanuel's theory is essentially Ricardian and will be
treated as such here.
7See Emmanuel (1972). Other main contributors to the development of the
Theory of Unequal Exchange are Amin (1973), Saigal (1973) and Braun (1971).
Amin's contribution is Marxian rather than neo-Ricardian, and will be dealt with
more fully in a paper on the Marxist critique of the theory of comparative
advantage.
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Emmanuel's attack on the theory of comparative advantage
challenges first the assumptions about factor mobility made by
Ricardo. (As already noted in Section 2, altering the assumptions
about factor mobility is of no real consequence to the neo-classical
model). Whilst retaining the assumption of labour immobility inter-
nationally, Emmanuel argues forceftilly for the treatment of capital
as internationally mobile, with the rate of profit tending towards
equality in all countries. In this respect, Emmanuel's model is but a
special case of the 'English' neo-Ricardian model discussed in the
previous section, which encompasses the case of both mobile and
immobile capital. Secondly, he rejects the lack of explicit treatment
of capital in the Ricardian model, and its treatment as having a
marginal product equal to its profit, as in the neo-classical case. He
treats capital as a produced input as in the tableaux of Marx and the
'English' neo-Ricardian system discussed in the previous section.
Thirdly, he adopts a specific theory of income distribution, namely
that wages are determined independently by historical and moral
forces. In addition, unlike the 'English' neo-Ricardian theory pre-
sented in Section 3, Emmanuel assumes that relative prices play no
role in the determination of the composition of the bundle of com-
modities consumed. From this model, Emmanuel establishes the
direct relationship between the international terms of trade and the
cost of labour power, as measured by the bundle of commodities
required to maintain labour. Thus, in a world of identical techniques
of production, and internationally mobile capital but different
wages, a situation which in the Ricardian model leads to no differ-
ences in the pre-trade price ratios with no possibility of gainful trade,
generates in both the 'English' neo-Ricardian and 'Unequal Ex-
change' models the possibility of gainful trade. (In the neo-classical
case, identical techniques of production and preferences in con-
sumption will only lead to identical pre-trade price ratios when
factor endowments are identical). Abstracting from the question of
capitalist consumption, the introduction of trade under these cir-
cumstances will lead to a rise in the rate of profit for the high-wage
country and a fall in the rate of profit for the low-wage country. The
reader is referred to the Appendix for a more detailed exposition.
The trading relationship results in 'Unequal Exchange' in the sense
that there is a transfer of reinvestibic surplus (surplus value) from the
low-wage to the high-wage country via the terms of trade. It can also
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be established that the interests of workers in the high-wage country
are diametrically opposed to the interests of workers in the low-wage
country since, for a given international rate of profit, a rise in wages
in the high-wage country requires a lowering of wages in the
low-wage country to restore equality of prices of commodities
internationally (see Amin, 1973, and Saigal, 1973). It can also be
shown that the theory still holds when there are international
differences in productivity of some constant amount, provided that
international wage differentials do not exceed the productivity
differentials. Naturally, if productivity differentials differ in a non-
constant manner between countries in different industries, an
additional basis for trade (as in the original Ricardian model) is
established.
There are several problems with Emmanuel's 'Unequal Exchange'
model. First, there is the question of the choice of wages as the
independent variable, justified with his own analysis and with
quotations from Marx. Not only can it be argued that this approach
is a mis-reading of Marx, but Emmanuel has offered no convincing
theory as to how wages are determined over time.8 The choice of
wages as the independent variable leads directly to a second problem.
That is the suggestion that haemorrhage of 'Unequal Exchange'
(adverse terms of trade) can be removed by low-wage countries
simply by raising real wages. However correct this might be in the
abstract mathematical model, as a prescription for action it not only
abstracts from crucial economic and political factors but it relies on a
linear causal chain which is rather tendentious. That causal chain
suggests among other things, that higher wages will lead not only to
an improvement in the terms of trade but also to a round of
technical advance, which is only partially offsetting. Third, since the
'Unequal Exchange' model assumes a fixed technical coefficient
model of production and consumption, it is only by chance that the
two-country examples used will yield full employment of labour in
both countries. Nowhere is this problem discussed. In this respect,
the 'English' neo-Ricardian model described in the previous section
has been set out with far more technical care, with demand
conditions assumed to be sufficiently price-responsive to guarantee
8For discussion of this see Betteiheim (1972), Amin (1973), Pilling (1973).
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full employment. This does not mean that implicit assumptions in
the 'Unequal Exchange' model regarding price substitutability and
therefore employment are incorrect, for it is quite plausible to argue
that price substitutability is quite insufficient to guarantee full
employment in a capitalist economy. Fourth, by definition, when
the possibility of unequal exchange exists the low-wage country will
have a pre-trade profit rate which is higher than after-trade regardless
of which commodities it trades. Yet with the exception of Amin
(1973) there is no analysis as to why capitalists in the low-wage
country will accept this result or what will determine the actual
pattern of specialization. Furthermore, the mere existence of 'Un-
equal Exchange' defined in this sense means that there is a ready
made argument for a sharp move towards autarky for the low-wage
country to raise the rate of economic growth. Whilst it may be true
that such a possibility will exist under some circumstances (e.g.
Japan), the argument is not only simplistic but the model (unlike the
neo-Ricardian model first discussed), has not been developed to
encompass trading relationships when the exchange is not unequal in
the sense that productivity differentials exceed wage differentials.
Such an omission might be justified if there was strong, systemati-
cally compiled empirical evidence put forward to show that trading
relationships between rich and poor countries were in fact character-
ized by unequal exchange in this sense, but this has not been done. A
related criticism is that the trading relationship between countries of
similar levels of development cannot be analysed within the unequal
exchange model as developed.
A Generalization of the Lewis and Prebisch-Singer Terms of Trade
Models
The Emmanuel Unequal Exchange model can be regarded as a
generalization of both the Lewis surplus labour model and of the
Prebisch-Singer terms of trade model (see Lewis, 1954, Prebisch,
1951 and Singer, 1949). In the former, wages are determined by the
subsistence sector so that gains from trade in plantation sectors using
surplus labour from the subsistence sector are transmitted to the
richer high-wage country either via the terms of trade or through
profits derived from the ownership of plantations. In the Prebisch-
Singer model, institutional factors in the wage bargaining process
lead to a transfer of the benefits of technical progress in low-wage
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countries to the high-wage countries via a deterioration of the terms
of trade of poor countries. (It is note-worthy that neo-classicists,
unable to deal with institutional factors in the wage bargaining
process, dismiss this part of the Prebisch-Singer terms of trade
argument, using demand and factor augmentation arguments to
explain shifts in the terms of trade for poor countries as described in
Section 2. See, for example, Sodersten (1970)). In terms of the
'Unequal Exchange' model, technical change in the export sector of
the poor country leads to a deterioration of the terms of trade of
the poor country and a rise in the international rate of profit. If the
capitalists of the rich country face strong unions, but no institutional
pressure to increase wages in the poor country, then at a constant
rate of profit the gains from technical change in the poor country
can be used to increase wages in the rich country. The point is not
without policy consequences. For example, Singer himself in a later
piece already mentioned (Singer et al. 1973) and the article by
Singer in this bulletin argues for trade liberalization in agricultural
products as an employment creating device with favourable income
redistribution consequences in poor countries. Taking into account
Singer's own simple bargaining model, made more plausible by more
recent theoretical development, this opens the possibility for any
short-run gains from such freer-trade to be 'bargained' away by the
richer countries. Thus, not only might such a freer-trade policy move
poor countries away from better trading positions but it may open
them to greater possibilities of having the short-run gains bid away. If
such a policy were intended for the main benefit of the stronger
Third World countries, one might be able to counter this by showing
that, in fact, the 'bargain' might go against the rich countries and in
favour of the poor. However, this is not the case here since it is
precisely because it is believed that freer-trade in agriculture will
benefit the poorest Third World countries (and presumably the
weakest) that the policy is advocated. (For a more technical
exposition of these points, the reader is referred to the appendix).
Concluding Remarks
The essential thrust of this paper has been to suggest that recent
developments in the theory of comparative advantage have deep
consequences not only for future directions in the development of
the theory of international value, but also for questions of policy and
45
action in the concrete world. The neo-Ricardian critiques of the
theory of comparative advantage have their main strength in pro-
viding a sharp critique of both the Ricardian and neo-classical view.
It is not intended to suggest here that, as a consequence of the
neo-Ricardian critique, all previous empirical and policy oriented
research has been misleading. Rather the intention has been to raise
some new questions which urgently require answers. Much theor-
etical and empirical work remains to be done to develop a fully-
fledged neo-Ricardian view.
There are at least three major problems with the neo-Ricardian
critiques of the theory of comparative advantage as developed so far.
First, although the issue of income distribution is dealt with in a
more satisfactory manner than in the neo-classical model, it remains
determined by 'technical' factors which are not the subject of
systematic analysis. In Marxist terms, the neo-Ricardian theory is
located in the sphere of circulation rather than production. Second,
the theory remains essentially static with no attempt to move
beyond comparative statics to a more dynamic view. Third, there has
been little analysis of concrete situations to establish likely tenden-
cies or patterns in the movement of a more dynamic system. The
neo-Ricardian theory, still in its infancy, has so far performed only a
debunking function. Fourth, there has been little or no attempt to
relate the economic with political, social and historical factors to
build a unified theory of international trade and value. These
considerations will be taken up in more detail in a forthcoming paper
surveying recent Marxist critiques of the theory of comparative
advantage.
appendix
A diagramatic exposition of the 'Unequal Exchange' model
Assume that there are two countries and two commodities produced
with identical techniques of production in each country under
constant returns to scale. The organic composition of capital differs
between sectors and there are no joint products or externalities. For
convenience it is assumed that capitalist consumption is zero. Then
for given but different (up to a scalar multiple) bundles of com-
modities which enter the worker's consumption basket, the level of
wages being expressed by the scalars W1 and W2, it is possible to
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show the relationship between the long-run steady state rates of
profit and growth (r and g) and the terms of trade (P1 /P2) as
follows:
It is assumed that country 2 is the high-wage country, so that W2 )
W1. Assuming that sector 1 has the higher organic composition of
capital, it follows that under autarky (A) in each country,
(P1/P2) ) (P1/P A2)2
r1 A=g1 A > r2
Ag2 Aand
(r,g)(rj,gj.**I
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Now if country 2 specializes in the production of commodity 1, then
the relationship between the terms of trade and the rate of profit
(growth) will be given by W2 W2; as the terms of trade improve, the
rate of profit (growth) will rise. The W2W2 curve to the left of
(P1 /P2 )'is shown with a dashed line to indicate that specialization is
taking place in the 'wrong' direction with profits and growth rates
less than under autarky. Similarly, the W2 W2 curve shows the
relationship between the rate of profit (growth) and the terms of
trade when country 2 specializes in producing commodity 2. The
W1 W1 and W1 W1 functions are for country 1 when specializing in
commodity 2 and 1 respectively.
Given the above assumptions, there are two possible equilibrium
terms of trade denoted by (P1 ¡P2 )' and (P1 /P2 ).*, with associated
rates of profit (growth) of (g') and ri,* (g*). In both cases, the
equilibrium terms of trade lie outside of the Ricardian limbo region,
(P1 ¡P2 ) and (P1 /P2 ). Further, the equilibrium rate of profit
(growth) is higher with trade for the high-wage country and lower for
the low-wage country.
If there are both different techniques of production and different
wage rates, so that the second country profits (growth) and terms of
trade locus is characterized by W2' W2' then equilibrium terms of trade
(PiIP2)** inside the limbo region are possible. Note that in this case,
both countries have a higher profit (growth) rate after trade.
Note that nothing has been said about the relationship between the
implied rates of growth of output and employment in each country
and the actual rates of growth of the workforce, or the initial
distribution of the workforce between the two economies. In the
absence of price substitution in consumption or production, there
will be full employment in either economy under autarky only by
accident. With trade and the international equalization of the rate of
profit, there will only be full employment in both economies in the
unlikely event that the international rate of profit will equal the rate
of growth of the workforce in both economies.
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To see how the 'Unequal Exchange' model can be used to show the
generalized Lewis model, or the Prebisch-Singer model of inequality
of transmission of the benefits of technical change, it should be
noted that:
An improvement in the productivity of labour in economy I will
shift the W1 W1 function upwards in the long run say to WPW in
diagram 1.
An increase in wages in country 2 will shift the function
downwards in the long run say to W W in diagram 1.
The same relationships will hold for country 2. Hence when there is
an improvement in productivity in country 1 at unchanged wages,
the terms of trade worsen in the long run for country 1 and there is a
rise in the rate of profit (growth). If there is a subsequent rise in
wages in country 2 to restore profits (growth) to the previous levels,
there is a further deterioration in the terms of trade for the low wage
country. Thus, if there is a difference in the bargaining power of
workers between the rich and poor countries operating over a long
period, the poor country will tend to be pushed further and further
into 'Unequal Exchange'. Note also that this dynamic effect of the
hypothesized redistribution of the benefits of growth towards the
rich country is not dependent on the exchange relationship being
initially 'unequal' in the Emmanuel sense.
Finally, diagram 1 can be used to illustrate the point made by the
'English' neo-Ricardian model that trade can lower both wages and
profits in a country. This can be seen by noting that just as a
technical improvement will shift the W1 W1 function upwards to
W? W?, so will a fall in wages shift the function to, say, W'1 W'. Thus
the point H characterizes a free trade point for country 1 which has
both a lower rate of profit and lower wages than under autarky,
represented by the point B.
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